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But the basic point has become uncontroversial. Or as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy puts it, “After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.” Different camps and thinkers define the causes and contours of this rivalry in different ways: They may see the biggest challenge in Beijing or in Moscow or in Tehran or somewhere else. After an era of uncontested American dominance, the thinking goes, we have entered a new era of rivalry. In introspective moments, it asks itself whether anything it says or does matters at all.īut for all the turmoil and torment, that establishment is in fact converging around a stronger consensus than any it has held since the Cold War. It gets much of the blame for a quarter-century of flailing hegemony, one characterized by, depending on whom you ask, too much foreign intervention (Kosovo, Iraq, Libya) or too little (Rwanda, Syria, Iran).

It is watching a president spurn its expertise, attack its institutions and ridicule its most cherished assumptions. The American foreign policy establishment is two years into a prolonged existential crisis. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements By Ted Galen Carpenter THE EMPIRE AND THE FIVE KINGS America’s Abdication and the Fate of the World By Bernard-Henri Lévy
